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ELEMENTS OF AN ADVERSE USER SUFFICIENT TO
START THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
RUNNING-PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
Wilson v. Waters'

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of Howard
County, as to three judgments there entered against defendant Wilson. The controversy arose through a claim
of easement by prescription over a dirt road running between two adjoining lots in North Laurel. The three plaintiffs owned houses situated on the northernmost lot; defendant owned the lot adjoining plaintiffs' property on
the south. Both lots fronted on the same avenue. The
road, described in .the testimony as a country lane between
18 and 20 feet wide, began at the avenue and ran along
the northern line of defendant's land. In their respective
suits, which were consolidated and tried together, plaintiffs
alleged that they had used the road, without asking permission of anyone, as a means of access to the rear of their
houses, for a period in excess of 20 years. The testimony
further showed that plaintiffs had undertaken to keep it
in repair, by putting stones on it when necessary, and by
the addition to it of a large amount of plaster. The defendant had erected a fence along the northern line, and
a gate across the road at the intersection of the avenue,
which gate was then locked. Subsequently, the defendant
removed the gate and extended the fence across the road,
thus depriving the plaintiffs of its use. Defendant's motions
for directed verdicts were denied by the trial court, after
which the jury awarded verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs
for the sum of Five Dollars in each case. On appeal, the
verdicts were unanimously affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
The Court pointed out that it is well settled that adverse
possession, sufficient to give marketable title to land, must
be open and notorious, continuous and exclusive, and that
under the Statute of 21 James I, ch. 16 (1623), the Statute
of Limitations,2 no person having a right of entry into
any land shall enter thereunto but within 20 years after
the accrual of such right. This has always been the law in
Maryland.
164 A. 2d 135 (Md. 1949).
This Statute is in force in Maryland, by virtue of the Md. Declaration
of Rights, Art. 5, which adopted the common law and applicable statutes
of England existing as of July 4, 1776. See 2 Alex. Br. Stat. 599.
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The Statute of Limitations was designed by Parliament
to apply solely to corporeal rights; there is nothing in the
Statute itself which is ipso facto applicable to incorporeal
interests. The Court states, however, that: "While the
Statute of Limitations does not apply to adverse user of
another's land by mere enjoyment of an easement, nevertheless the Statute applicable to re-entry into land has been
made applicable by analogy to incorporeal rights."3 On
this point there is substantial unanimity among the authorities. A frequently cited work states: "In this country
the courts have usually followed the analogy of the statute
of limitations applicable to actions for the recovery of land,
with the effect that one who has exercised as of right a
user in another's land for the statutory period, is regarded
as having a right of user to that extent, the length of the
period of prescription changing as the statutory period is
changed."' The Court of Appeals of New York, in Kin
5 held that:
Co., Inc. v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corporation
"This court is committed to the view that the doctrine
of prescription is to be treated as the application to incorporeal rights of the statutes of limitations within the limits
of the strong analogy between the two rules."
Under this analogy to the case of adverse possession and
the Statute of Limitations, the claimant, in order to acquire
a prescriptive right, must prove an adverse, exclusive and
continuous use of the way for the duration of the statutory
period.' There is little if any disagreement among the
courts and text-writers as to the theory of such a user.
The doctrine of prescription is based on the theory that
if one makes use of another's land, without permission,
and the owner fails to interfere to prevent such use, such
acquiescence, on the part of the landowner, in order to
discourage litigation, and also to obviate the difficulty of
proving title after lapse of time, is to be considered as
evidence that the user is rightful.
The term "rightful" is commonly used in the sense that
easements by prescription were originally based on the
presumption that there had been a grant of the contested
right, but that the grant had been lost. This was a legal
fiction designed to confuse no one, being engendered as a
Supra, n. 1, 137.
'4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) sec. 1191.
271 N. Y. 376, 3 N. E. 2d 516 (1936).
See: Waters v. Snouffer. 88 Md. 391, 41 A. 785 (1898) ; Hansel v. Collins,
180 'Md. 209, 23 A. 2d 686 (1942) ; Smith rv. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A. 2d
795 (1942) ; Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A. 2d 66 (1945), Note, Wals
of Nece8ity-hInpZed in Lao or Implied in Fact (1948) 9 Md. L. Rev. 84;
Punte v. Taylor, 53 A. 2d 773, 777 (Md. 1947).
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means of subverting the rule of pleading requiring profert.
There has been in the past a considerable difference of
opinion among the courts as to the conclusiveness of this
presumption. In its infancy, the fiction was regarded as
a presumption of fact only, and rebuttable as such. Gradually, however, many of the courts-perhaps a majoritybegan to hold that the presumption arising from this fiction
was irrebuttable and conclusive.7 The result of these decisions, in effect, was that the presumption came to be
regarded as no presumption at all but as a positive rule
of substantive law, thus raising the fiction of a lost grant
to the level of a praesumptiojuris et de jure.
Some jurisdictions, however, continued to consider the
presumption of a grant rebuttable.' In the long run, it is
this latter view which has prevailed, in the sense that it
is now generally held that the presumption can be rebutted
by showing that the use was by express permission, or
that the owner of the servient tenement was under a
legal disability, and could not, therefore, give consent or
legal acquiescence, or, in other words, by the interposition
of any of the excusatory pleas that are open to a plaintiff
in ejectment against a plea by the defendant of the
Statute of Limitations.'
There are no grounds of discord among the various
courts as to the indicia of the individual elements of an
adverse use. While it is true that the language used, as
between any two given courts, is sometimes mildly different, the result is generally the same. It remains, however,
difficult to find an exact statement of what is meant by
the term "adverse". It is everywhere conceded that to be
adverse the user must be inconsistent with the rights of
the landowner, in the sense that there must be some actual
invasion or infringement of the rights of another, which
must not be accompanied by any express or implied recognition of the right of the landowner to put a stop to it,
since an admission, by the person claiming the easement,
of a superior right in the owner of the servient tenement
is fatal to the claim. It is fundamental that the user must
be such as to give rise to a cause of action, since if the
landowner cannot interfere with it, he cannot be deprived
7See:
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. L. 605, 619 (1881):
Ward v. Warren, 82 N. Y. 265 (1880) ; Dalton v. Angus, L. R. 6 App. Cas.
740 (1881).
8See: Worrall v. Rhoads, 12 Whart. 427, 30 Am. Dec. 274 (Pa. 1837)
Eells v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., 49 W. Va. 65, 38 S, Pi.479, 87 Am. St.
Rep. 787 (1901).
9 See: Boyce iv.Missouri Pacific R. Co., 168 Mo. 83, 68 'S. W. 920 58
L. R. A. 442 (1920).
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by it of any of his rights. There is frequently coupled
with this requirement of adversity of use the additional
requirement that the user be exercised under a "claim of
right". The use of this term has not been fortunate. The
courts have experienced some difficulty in defining it.
Generally, it is dealt with by the application of the rule
that it is sufficient if the assertion of such claim of right
can be inferred from the nature of the user itself. Thus
the Court of Appeals in the instant case stated: "It may
be stated as a general rule that when a person has used a
roadway over the land of another openly and continuously
and without objection for twenty years, it will be presumed
that the use has been adverse under a claim of right,
unless it appears to have been by permission. To prevent
a prescriptive easement from arising from such use, the
owner of the land has the burden of showing that the use
of the way was by license inconsistent with a claim of
right.""
In requiring that the use be a continuous one, the courts
imply a use continuing over the prescriptive period. It is
by no means necessary that the use be a daily one, or one
denoting regularity measurable in any other length of time.
The general requirement is that the use be of such frequency as to put the landowner on notice as to its enjoyment. In Cox v. Forrest" it was held that: "Nor does the
law mean by 'an uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment'
that a person shall use the way every day for twenty years,
but simply that he exercises the right more or less frequently, according to the nature of the use to which its
enjoyment may be applied . . . and under such circumstances as excludes the presumption of a voluntary abandonment on the part of the person claiming it."
An examination of the term "exclusive" points up the
one instance in which the general affinity between the
rules of adverse possession and adverse user breaks down.
"Exclusive", in its application to the doctrine of adverse
possession, has always meant that to acquire title the disseisor must demonstrate an intent to exclude all and sundry, i.e., he must claim as against the world at large. But
it has long been recognized that such is not the connotation
of the term when it is applied to adverse user. As to this,
the Court states: "We recognize, however, that while adverse possession . . . must be absolutely exclusive, the
10Supra, n. 1, 138; Hansel v. Collins, supra, n. 6; Smith v. Shiebeck,
811pra, n. 6.
"60 Md. 74, 80 (1883) ; see also, Stuart v. Johnson, 181 Md. 145, 149,
28 A. 2d 837 (1942) ; Annot.. 98 A. L. R. 1291.
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user essential for establishing an easement is exclusive in
the limited sense that the claimant's right must not depend
for its enjoyment upon a similar right in others, and, though
claimant may not have been the only one who used it, he
used it under a claim of right independently of all others."'"
This is the doctrine strongly pronounced in Cox v. Forrest,
a leading case on the subject. In the instant case, the evidence showed that no one had been denied the use of the
road, and that tradesmen had used it for their respective
purposes. The Court held that the physical acts of the
plaintiffs, previously alluded to, in repairing the road, indicated a use sufficiently distinguishable from the general
use,13 and that the tradesmen were visitors whose right
of passage was based upon the claim of right of the owners
of the houses. This position is further strengthened by
adoption of the rule announced in Hall v. Backus, 4 to the
effect .that if a road led at its start only to the premises
of the persons using it, such circumstance is sufficient to
prove their user under a claim of exclusive right, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and if user of a road is
commenced in such a manner as to make it adverse and
exclusive, it does not lose its adverse character as a result
of the joinder of the public therein.
The result of this decision, and of the other Maryland
cases cited, is to place Maryland in line with the growing
modern tendency to disregard the fiction of a lost grant.
By analogizing the rules of adverse possession and adverse
user as to the application of the statutes of limitations the
courts have wisely avoided the necessity of resort to the
earlier fiction, and have developed a more positive rule
with which to work. The doctrine of a lost grant may have
served a useful purpose, in its time and place, but no
justification for its continued existence remains when the
courts have developed a simpler and more direct approach.
It is sometimes said that prescriptive rights do not
enjoy the particular favor of the law, in that the law does
not favor forfeitures. 5 While it is true that the law in no
way favors adverse possession, it does not follow from
this that the doctrine of prescription is viewed with
disapprobation. The Court of Appeals stated: "An ease2Supra, n. 1, 137; see also TIFFANY, op. cit., 8upra, n. 4, sec. 1199; 28
C. J. S., 657; WASHBURN, EASEMENTS (4th ed. 1885) 164; Annot., 111 A. L. R.
221; Marta v. Trincia, 22 A. 2d 519 (Del. Chan. 1941); DeShields v.
Joest, 109 Ind. App. 383, 34 N. E. 2d 168 (1941).
-See: Pirman v. Confer, 273 N. Y. 357, 7 N. E. 2d 262 (1937).
"92 W. Va. 155, 114 S. E. 449 (1922).

See, e.g., Long v. Leonard, 191 Wash. 284, 71 P. 2d 1, 4 (1937).
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ment over (the defendant's) land by prescription is
sanctioned by public policy."1 Though the granting of
a prescriptive easement is determinative of a corresponding
loss or forfeiture of right by another, there is no great
hardship in a rule which dictates that the owner of a
servient tenement may not successfully sleep on his rights.
This is especially apparent in those states in which the
prescriptive period is quite long, as in Maryland. There
can be little quarrel with the rule that long-continued
peaceful enjoyment of property rights should not be disturbed, and with direct rather than fictional justification
for its application.

AWARD OF ALIMONY AGAINST NON-RESIDENT
DEFENDANT HAVING PROPERTY
WITHIN STATE
Keen v. Keen'
A recent case, Keen v. Keen, has provided us with the
first interpretation of the Maryland statute authorizing
the award of alimony against a non-resident who is alleged
to have property within the state.' That this should be
the first time during the forty years in which the statute
has been in effect, that the Court of Appeals has been
called upon to interpret and apply it is somewhat surprising in the light of the voluminous amount of legal controversy that has arisen over the validity and application
of similar statutes in other states. As to the validity of
the basic principle embodied in such a statute, there is
little or no conflict of views throughout the United States;
it is in the application thereof that the difficulty and the
variance of views arise, due especially to the language of
each individual act and the procedure to be followed thereunder.
Mrs. Keen in 1946, seeking a divorce a mensa on the
ground of desertion, filed her bill of complaint wherein
permanent alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel
fee were also prayed. The bill alleged that her husband
was now believed to be a non-resident of Maryland; service
11Supra, n. 1, 139; Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. ,v. McFarlan, supra, n. 7; Board
of Education, etc. v. Nichol, 70 Ohio App. 467, 46 N. E. 2d 872 (1942).
'60 A. 2d 200 (Md. 1948).
Md. Code (1939) Axt. 16, Sec. 16.

